/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #include "alloc-util.h" #include "dns-domain.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "fileio.h" #include "gcrypt-util.h" #include "hexdecoct.h" #include "memory-util.h" #include "memstream-util.h" #include "openssl-util.h" #include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" #include "resolved-dns-packet.h" #include "sort-util.h" #include "string-table.h" #if PREFER_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 # pragma GCC diagnostic push # pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(RSA*, RSA_free, NULL); DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(EC_KEY*, EC_KEY_free, NULL); # pragma GCC diagnostic pop #endif #define VERIFY_RRS_MAX 256 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE (32*1024) /* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */ #define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE) /* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. RFC5155 says 2500 shall be the maximum useful value, but * RFC9276 § 3.2 says that we should reduce the acceptable iteration count */ #define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 100 /* * The DNSSEC Chain of trust: * * Normal RRs are protected via RRSIG RRs in combination with DNSKEY RRs, all in the same zone * DNSKEY RRs are either protected like normal RRs, or via a DS from a zone "higher" up the tree * DS RRs are protected like normal RRs * * Example chain: * Normal RR → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → ... → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS */ uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool mask_revoke) { const uint8_t *p; uint32_t sum, f; /* The algorithm from RFC 4034, Appendix B. */ assert(dnskey); assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); f = (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.flags; if (mask_revoke) f &= ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE; sum = f + ((((uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.protocol) << 8) + (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); p = dnskey->dnskey.key; for (size_t i = 0; i < dnskey->dnskey.key_size; i++) sum += (i & 1) == 0 ? (uint32_t) p[i] << 8 : (uint32_t) p[i]; sum += (sum >> 16) & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); return sum & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); } #if HAVE_OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT static int rr_compare(DnsResourceRecord * const *a, DnsResourceRecord * const *b) { const DnsResourceRecord *x = *a, *y = *b; size_t m; int r; /* Let's order the RRs according to RFC 4034, Section 6.3 */ assert(x); assert(x->wire_format); assert(y); assert(y->wire_format); m = MIN(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(y)); r = memcmp(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(y), m); if (r != 0) return r; return CMP(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(y)); } static int dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm, const void *signature, size_t signature_size, const void *data, size_t data_size, const void *exponent, size_t exponent_size, const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size) { int r; #if PREFER_OPENSSL # pragma GCC diagnostic push # pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" _cleanup_(RSA_freep) RSA *rpubkey = NULL; _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_freep) EVP_PKEY *epubkey = NULL; _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_CTX_freep) EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; _cleanup_(BN_freep) BIGNUM *e = NULL, *m = NULL; assert(hash_algorithm); e = BN_bin2bn(exponent, exponent_size, NULL); if (!e) return -EIO; m = BN_bin2bn(modulus, modulus_size, NULL); if (!m) return -EIO; rpubkey = RSA_new(); if (!rpubkey) return -ENOMEM; if (RSA_set0_key(rpubkey, m, e, NULL) <= 0) return -EIO; e = m = NULL; assert((size_t) RSA_size(rpubkey) == signature_size); epubkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (!epubkey) return -ENOMEM; if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(epubkey, RSAPublicKey_dup(rpubkey)) <= 0) return -EIO; ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(epubkey, NULL); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, hash_algorithm) <= 0) return -EIO; r = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, signature, signature_size, data, data_size); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); # pragma GCC diagnostic pop #else gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; gcry_mpi_t n = NULL, e = NULL, s = NULL; gcry_error_t ge; assert(hash_algorithm); ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature, signature_size, NULL); if (ge != 0) { r = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, exponent, exponent_size, NULL); if (ge != 0) { r = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&n, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, modulus, modulus_size, NULL); if (ge != 0) { r = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, NULL, "(sig-val (rsa (s %m)))", s); if (ge != 0) { r = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, NULL, "(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))", hash_algorithm, (int) data_size, data); if (ge != 0) { r = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, NULL, "(public-key (rsa (n %m) (e %m)))", n, e); if (ge != 0) { r = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) r = 0; else if (ge != 0) r = log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "RSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); else r = 1; finish: if (e) gcry_mpi_release(e); if (n) gcry_mpi_release(n); if (s) gcry_mpi_release(s); if (public_key_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); if (signature_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); if (data_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); #endif return r; } static int dnssec_rsa_verify( hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm, const void *hash, size_t hash_size, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { size_t exponent_size, modulus_size; void *exponent, *modulus; assert(hash_algorithm); assert(hash); assert(hash_size > 0); assert(rrsig); assert(dnskey); if (*(uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key == 0) { /* exponent is > 255 bytes long */ exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3; exponent_size = ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]) << 8) | ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[2]); if (exponent_size < 256) return -EINVAL; if (3 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) return -EINVAL; modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3 + exponent_size; modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 3 - exponent_size; } else { /* exponent is <= 255 bytes long */ exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1; exponent_size = (size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]; if (exponent_size <= 0) return -EINVAL; if (1 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) return -EINVAL; modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1 + exponent_size; modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 1 - exponent_size; } return dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( hash_algorithm, rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, hash, hash_size, exponent, exponent_size, modulus, modulus_size); } static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm, elliptic_curve_t curve, const void *signature_r, size_t signature_r_size, const void *signature_s, size_t signature_s_size, const void *data, size_t data_size, const void *key, size_t key_size) { int k; #if PREFER_OPENSSL # pragma GCC diagnostic push # pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" _cleanup_(EC_GROUP_freep) EC_GROUP *ec_group = NULL; _cleanup_(EC_POINT_freep) EC_POINT *p = NULL; _cleanup_(EC_KEY_freep) EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; _cleanup_(BN_CTX_freep) BN_CTX *bctx = NULL; _cleanup_(BN_freep) BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; _cleanup_(ECDSA_SIG_freep) ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; assert(hash_algorithm); ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve); if (!ec_group) return -ENOMEM; p = EC_POINT_new(ec_group); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; bctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!bctx) return -ENOMEM; if (EC_POINT_oct2point(ec_group, p, key, key_size, bctx) <= 0) return -EIO; eckey = EC_KEY_new(); if (!eckey) return -ENOMEM; if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, ec_group) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, p) <= 0) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "EC_POINT_bn2point failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); assert(EC_KEY_check_key(eckey) == 1); r = BN_bin2bn(signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL); if (!r) return -EIO; s = BN_bin2bn(signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL); if (!s) return -EIO; /* TODO: We should eventually use the EVP API once it supports ECDSA signature verification */ sig = ECDSA_SIG_new(); if (!sig) return -ENOMEM; if (ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) <= 0) return -EIO; r = s = NULL; k = ECDSA_do_verify(data, data_size, sig, eckey); if (k < 0) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); # pragma GCC diagnostic pop #else gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; gcry_mpi_t q = NULL, r = NULL, s = NULL; gcry_error_t ge; assert(hash_algorithm); ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&r, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&q, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, key, key_size, NULL); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, NULL, "(sig-val (ecdsa (r %m) (s %m)))", r, s); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, NULL, "(data (flags rfc6979) (hash %s %b))", hash_algorithm, (int) data_size, data); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, NULL, "(public-key (ecc (curve %s) (q %m)))", curve, q); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) k = 0; else if (ge != 0) { log_debug("ECDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); k = -EIO; } else k = 1; finish: if (r) gcry_mpi_release(r); if (s) gcry_mpi_release(s); if (q) gcry_mpi_release(q); if (public_key_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); if (signature_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); if (data_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); #endif return k; } static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify( hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm, int algorithm, const void *hash, size_t hash_size, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { elliptic_curve_t curve; size_t key_size; uint8_t *q; assert(hash); assert(hash_size); assert(rrsig); assert(dnskey); if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256) { curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "NIST P-256"); /* NIST P-256 */ key_size = 32; } else if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384) { curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_secp384r1, "NIST P-384"); /* NIST P-384 */ key_size = 48; } else return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (dnskey->dnskey.key_size != key_size * 2) return -EINVAL; if (rrsig->rrsig.signature_size != key_size * 2) return -EINVAL; q = newa(uint8_t, key_size*2 + 1); q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */ memcpy(q+1, dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size*2); return dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( hash_algorithm, curve, rrsig->rrsig.signature, key_size, (uint8_t*) rrsig->rrsig.signature + key_size, key_size, hash, hash_size, q, key_size*2+1); } static int dnssec_eddsa_verify_raw( elliptic_curve_t curve, const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size) { #if PREFER_OPENSSL _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_freep) EVP_PKEY *evkey = NULL; _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_CTX_freep) EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; int r; assert(curve == NID_ED25519); assert(signature_size == key_size * 2); uint8_t *q = newa(uint8_t, signature_size + 1); q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */ memcpy(q+1, signature, signature_size); evkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, NULL, key, key_size); if (!evkey) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(evkey, NULL); if (!pctx) return -ENOMEM; ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; /* This prevents EVP_DigestVerifyInit from managing pctx and complicating our free logic. */ EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx(ctx, pctx); /* One might be tempted to use EVP_PKEY_verify_init, but see Ed25519(7ssl). */ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pctx, NULL, NULL, evkey) <= 0) return -EIO; r = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, signature, signature_size, data, data_size); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); return r; #elif GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600 gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; gcry_error_t ge; int k; assert(signature_size == key_size * 2); ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, NULL, "(sig-val (eddsa (r %b) (s %b)))", (int) key_size, signature, (int) key_size, signature + key_size); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, NULL, "(data (flags eddsa) (hash-algo sha512) (value %b))", (int) data_size, data); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, NULL, "(public-key (ecc (curve %s) (flags eddsa) (q %b)))", curve, (int) key_size, key); if (ge != 0) { k = -EIO; goto finish; } ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) k = 0; else if (ge != 0) k = log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "EdDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); else k = 1; finish: if (public_key_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); if (signature_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); if (data_sexp) gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); return k; #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } static int dnssec_eddsa_verify( int algorithm, const void *data, size_t data_size, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { elliptic_curve_t curve; size_t key_size; if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ED25519) { curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_ED25519, "Ed25519"); key_size = 32; } else return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (dnskey->dnskey.key_size != key_size) return -EINVAL; if (rrsig->rrsig.signature_size != key_size * 2) return -EINVAL; return dnssec_eddsa_verify_raw( curve, rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, data, data_size, dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size); } static int md_add_uint8(hash_context_t ctx, uint8_t v) { #if PREFER_OPENSSL return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &v, sizeof(v)); #else gcry_md_write(ctx, &v, sizeof(v)); return 0; #endif } static int md_add_uint16(hash_context_t ctx, uint16_t v) { v = htobe16(v); #if PREFER_OPENSSL return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &v, sizeof(v)); #else gcry_md_write(ctx, &v, sizeof(v)); return 0; #endif } static void fwrite_uint8(FILE *fp, uint8_t v) { fwrite(&v, sizeof(v), 1, fp); } static void fwrite_uint16(FILE *fp, uint16_t v) { v = htobe16(v); fwrite(&v, sizeof(v), 1, fp); } static void fwrite_uint32(FILE *fp, uint32_t v) { v = htobe32(v); fwrite(&v, sizeof(v), 1, fp); } static int dnssec_rrsig_prepare(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { int n_key_labels, n_signer_labels; const char *name; int r; /* Checks whether the specified RRSIG RR is somewhat valid, and initializes the .n_skip_labels_source * and .n_skip_labels_signer fields so that we can use them later on. */ assert(rrsig); assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); /* Check if this RRSIG RR is already prepared */ if (rrsig->n_skip_labels_source != UINT8_MAX) return 0; if (rrsig->rrsig.inception > rrsig->rrsig.expiration) return -EINVAL; name = dns_resource_key_name(rrsig->key); n_key_labels = dns_name_count_labels(name); if (n_key_labels < 0) return n_key_labels; if (rrsig->rrsig.labels > n_key_labels) return -EINVAL; n_signer_labels = dns_name_count_labels(rrsig->rrsig.signer); if (n_signer_labels < 0) return n_signer_labels; if (n_signer_labels > rrsig->rrsig.labels) return -EINVAL; r = dns_name_skip(name, n_key_labels - n_signer_labels, &name); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) return -EINVAL; /* Check if the signer is really a suffix of us */ r = dns_name_equal(name, rrsig->rrsig.signer); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) return -EINVAL; assert(n_key_labels < UINT8_MAX); /* UINT8_MAX/-1 means unsigned. */ rrsig->n_skip_labels_source = n_key_labels - rrsig->rrsig.labels; rrsig->n_skip_labels_signer = n_key_labels - n_signer_labels; return 0; } static int dnssec_rrsig_expired(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { usec_t expiration, inception, skew; assert(rrsig); assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); expiration = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; inception = rrsig->rrsig.inception * USEC_PER_SEC; /* Consider inverted validity intervals as expired */ if (inception > expiration) return true; /* Permit a certain amount of clock skew of 10% of the valid * time range. This takes inspiration from unbound's * resolver. */ skew = (expiration - inception) / 10; if (skew > SKEW_MAX) skew = SKEW_MAX; if (inception < skew) inception = 0; else inception -= skew; if (expiration + skew < expiration) expiration = USEC_INFINITY; else expiration += skew; return realtime < inception || realtime > expiration; } static hash_md_t algorithm_to_implementation_id(uint8_t algorithm) { /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into an openssl/gcrypt digest identifier. * * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in * RFC6944. We don't implement any algorithms that are listed as "Optional" or "Must Not Implement". * Specifically, we do not implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and GOST-ECC. */ switch (algorithm) { case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha1(), GCRY_MD_SHA1); case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha256(), GCRY_MD_SHA256); case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha384(), GCRY_MD_SHA384); case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha512(), GCRY_MD_SHA512); default: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NULL, -EOPNOTSUPP); } } static void dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl( DnsResourceRecord *list[], unsigned n, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { assert(list); assert(n > 0); assert(rrsig); for (unsigned k = 0; k < n; k++) { DnsResourceRecord *rr = list[k]; /* Pick the TTL as the minimum of the RR's TTL, the * RR's original TTL according to the RRSIG and the * RRSIG's own TTL, see RFC 4035, Section 5.3.3 */ rr->ttl = MIN3(rr->ttl, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl, rrsig->ttl); rr->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; /* Copy over information about the signer and wildcard source of synthesis */ rr->n_skip_labels_source = rrsig->n_skip_labels_source; rr->n_skip_labels_signer = rrsig->n_skip_labels_signer; } rrsig->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; } static int dnssec_rrset_serialize_sig( DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, const char *source, DnsResourceRecord **list, size_t list_len, bool wildcard, char **ret_sig_data, size_t *ret_sig_size) { _cleanup_(memstream_done) MemStream m = {}; uint8_t wire_format_name[DNS_WIRE_FORMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; DnsResourceRecord *rr; FILE *f; int r; assert(rrsig); assert(source); assert(list || list_len == 0); assert(ret_sig_data); assert(ret_sig_size); f = memstream_init(&m); if (!f) return -ENOMEM; fwrite_uint16(f, rrsig->rrsig.type_covered); fwrite_uint8(f, rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); fwrite_uint8(f, rrsig->rrsig.labels); fwrite_uint32(f, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); fwrite_uint32(f, rrsig->rrsig.expiration); fwrite_uint32(f, rrsig->rrsig.inception); fwrite_uint16(f, rrsig->rrsig.key_tag); r = dns_name_to_wire_format(rrsig->rrsig.signer, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); if (r < 0) return r; fwrite(wire_format_name, 1, r, f); /* Convert the source of synthesis into wire format */ r = dns_name_to_wire_format(source, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); if (r < 0) return r; for (size_t k = 0; k < list_len; k++) { size_t l; rr = list[k]; /* Hash the source of synthesis. If this is a wildcard, then prefix it with the *. label */ if (wildcard) fwrite((uint8_t[]) { 1, '*'}, sizeof(uint8_t), 2, f); fwrite(wire_format_name, 1, r, f); fwrite_uint16(f, rr->key->type); fwrite_uint16(f, rr->key->class); fwrite_uint32(f, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); l = DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(rr); assert(l <= 0xFFFF); fwrite_uint16(f, (uint16_t) l); fwrite(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(rr), 1, l, f); } return memstream_finalize(&m, ret_sig_data, ret_sig_size); } static int dnssec_rrset_verify_sig( DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, const char *sig_data, size_t sig_size) { assert(rrsig); assert(dnskey); assert(sig_data); assert(sig_size > 0); hash_md_t md_algorithm; #if PREFER_OPENSSL uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned hash_size; #else _cleanup_(gcry_md_closep) gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; void *hash; size_t hash_size; initialize_libgcrypt(false); #endif switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ED25519: #if PREFER_OPENSSL || GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600 return dnssec_eddsa_verify( rrsig->rrsig.algorithm, sig_data, sig_size, rrsig, dnskey); #endif case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ED448: return -EOPNOTSUPP; default: /* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */ md_algorithm = algorithm_to_implementation_id(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); #if PREFER_OPENSSL if (!md_algorithm) return -EOPNOTSUPP; _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_algorithm, NULL) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sig_data, sig_size) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hash_size) <= 0) return -EIO; assert(hash_size > 0); #else if (md_algorithm < 0) return md_algorithm; gcry_error_t err = gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); if (gcry_err_code(err) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR || !md) return -EIO; hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); assert(hash_size > 0); gcry_md_write(md, sig_data, sig_size); hash = gcry_md_read(md, 0); if (!hash) return -EIO; #endif } switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: return dnssec_rsa_verify( OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(md_algorithm, gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm)), hash, hash_size, rrsig, dnskey); case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: return dnssec_ecdsa_verify( OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(md_algorithm, gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm)), rrsig->rrsig.algorithm, hash, hash_size, rrsig, dnskey); default: assert_not_reached(); } } int dnssec_verify_rrset( DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, usec_t realtime, DnssecResult *result) { DnsResourceRecord **list, *rr; const char *source, *name; _cleanup_free_ char *sig_data = NULL; size_t sig_size = 0; /* avoid false maybe-uninitialized warning */ size_t n = 0; bool wildcard; int r; assert(key); assert(rrsig); assert(dnskey); assert(result); assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); /* Verifies that the RRSet matches the specified "key" in "a", * using the signature "rrsig" and the key "dnskey". It's * assumed that RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */ r = dnssec_rrsig_prepare(rrsig); if (r == -EINVAL) { *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; return r; } if (r < 0) return r; r = dnssec_rrsig_expired(rrsig, realtime); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; return 0; } name = dns_resource_key_name(key); /* Some keys may only appear signed in the zone apex, and are invalid anywhere else. (SOA, NS...) */ if (dns_type_apex_only(rrsig->rrsig.type_covered)) { r = dns_name_equal(rrsig->rrsig.signer, name); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) { *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; return 0; } } /* OTOH DS RRs may not appear in the zone apex, but are valid everywhere else. */ if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered == DNS_TYPE_DS) { r = dns_name_equal(rrsig->rrsig.signer, name); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; return 0; } } /* Determine the "Source of Synthesis" and whether this is a wildcard RRSIG */ r = dns_name_suffix(name, rrsig->rrsig.labels, &source); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0 && !dns_type_may_wildcard(rrsig->rrsig.type_covered)) { /* We refuse to validate NSEC3 or SOA RRs that are synthesized from wildcards */ *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; return 0; } if (r == 1) { /* If we stripped a single label, then let's see if that maybe was "*". If so, we are not really * synthesized from a wildcard, we are the wildcard itself. Treat that like a normal name. */ r = dns_name_startswith(name, "*"); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) source = name; wildcard = r == 0; } else wildcard = r > 0; /* Collect all relevant RRs in a single array, so that we can look at the RRset */ list = newa(DnsResourceRecord *, dns_answer_size(a)); DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; /* We need the wire format for ordering, and digest calculation */ r = dns_resource_record_to_wire_format(rr, true); if (r < 0) return r; list[n++] = rr; if (n > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) return -E2BIG; } if (n <= 0) return -ENODATA; /* Bring the RRs into canonical order */ typesafe_qsort(list, n, rr_compare); r = dnssec_rrset_serialize_sig(rrsig, source, list, n, wildcard, &sig_data, &sig_size); if (r < 0) return r; r = dnssec_rrset_verify_sig(rrsig, dnskey, sig_data, sig_size); if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; return 0; } if (r < 0) return r; /* Now, fix the ttl, expiry, and remember the synthesizing source and the signer */ if (r > 0) dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(list, n, rrsig); if (r == 0) *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; else if (wildcard) *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD; else *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; return 0; } int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { assert(rrsig); assert(dnskey); /* Checks if the specified DNSKEY RR matches the key used for * the signature in the specified RRSIG RR */ if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) return -EINVAL; if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) return 0; if (dnskey->key->class != rrsig->key->class) return 0; if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) return 0; if (!revoked_ok && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) return 0; if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) return 0; if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) return 0; if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, false) != rrsig->rrsig.key_tag) return 0; return dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); } int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { assert(key); assert(rrsig); /* Checks if the specified RRSIG RR protects the RRSet of the specified RR key. */ if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) return 0; if (rrsig->key->class != key->class) return 0; if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered != key->type) return 0; return dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rrsig->key), dns_resource_key_name(key)); } int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, usec_t realtime, DnssecResult *result, DnsResourceRecord **ret_rrsig) { bool found_rrsig = false, found_invalid = false, found_expired_rrsig = false, found_unsupported_algorithm = false; unsigned nvalidations = 0; DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; int r; assert(key); assert(result); /* Verifies all RRs from "a" that match the key "key" against DNSKEYs in "validated_dnskeys" */ if (dns_answer_isempty(a)) return -ENODATA; /* Iterate through each RRSIG RR. */ DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, a) { DnsResourceRecord *dnskey; DnsAnswerFlags flags; /* Is this an RRSIG RR that applies to RRs matching our key? */ r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rrsig); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; found_rrsig = true; /* Look for a matching key */ DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(dnskey, flags, validated_dnskeys) { DnssecResult one_result; if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) continue; /* Is this a DNSKEY RR that matches they key of our RRSIG? */ r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, false); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; /* Take the time here, if it isn't set yet, so * that we do all validations with the same * time. */ if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); /* Have we seen an unreasonable number of invalid signaures? */ if (nvalidations > DNSSEC_INVALID_MAX) { if (ret_rrsig) *ret_rrsig = NULL; *result = DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS; return (int) nvalidations; } /* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching * DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of * the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY * combination. */ r = dnssec_verify_rrset(a, key, rrsig, dnskey, realtime, &one_result); if (r < 0) return r; nvalidations++; switch (one_result) { case DNSSEC_VALIDATED: case DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD: /* Yay, the RR has been validated, * return immediately, but fix up the expiry */ if (ret_rrsig) *ret_rrsig = rrsig; *result = one_result; return (int) nvalidations; case DNSSEC_INVALID: /* If the signature is invalid, let's try another key and/or signature. After all they key_tags and stuff are not unique, and might be shared by multiple keys. */ found_invalid = true; continue; case DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM: /* If the key algorithm is unsupported, try another RRSIG/DNSKEY pair, but remember we encountered this, so that we can return a proper error when we encounter nothing better. */ found_unsupported_algorithm = true; continue; case DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED: /* If the signature is expired, try another one, but remember it, so that we can return this */ found_expired_rrsig = true; continue; default: assert_not_reached(); } } } if (found_expired_rrsig) *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; else if (found_unsupported_algorithm) *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; else if (found_invalid) *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; else if (found_rrsig) *result = DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY; else *result = DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE; if (ret_rrsig) *ret_rrsig = NULL; return (int) nvalidations; } int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { DnsResourceRecord *rr; int r; /* Checks whether there's at least one RRSIG in 'a' that protects RRs of the specified key */ DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rr); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) return 1; } return 0; } static hash_md_t digest_to_hash_md(uint8_t algorithm) { /* Translates a DNSSEC digest algorithm into an openssl/gcrypt digest identifier */ switch (algorithm) { case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha1(), GCRY_MD_SHA1); case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha256(), GCRY_MD_SHA256); case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha384(), GCRY_MD_SHA384); default: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NULL, -EOPNOTSUPP); } } int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FORMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; int r; assert(dnskey); assert(ds); /* Implements DNSKEY verification by a DS, according to RFC 4035, section 5.2 */ if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) return -EINVAL; if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) return -EINVAL; if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) return -EKEYREJECTED; if (!mask_revoke && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) return -EKEYREJECTED; if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) return -EKEYREJECTED; if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != ds->ds.algorithm) return 0; if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, mask_revoke) != ds->ds.key_tag) return 0; r = dns_name_to_wire_format(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), wire_format, sizeof wire_format, true); if (r < 0) return r; hash_md_t md_algorithm = digest_to_hash_md(ds->ds.digest_type); #if PREFER_OPENSSL if (!md_algorithm) return -EOPNOTSUPP; _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; uint8_t result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md_algorithm); assert(hash_size > 0); if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size) return 0; ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_algorithm, NULL) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, wire_format, r) <= 0) return -EIO; if (mask_revoke) md_add_uint16(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.flags & ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); else md_add_uint16(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.flags); r = md_add_uint8(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); if (r <= 0) return r; r = md_add_uint8(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); if (r <= 0) return r; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, result, NULL) <= 0) return -EIO; #else if (md_algorithm < 0) return -EOPNOTSUPP; initialize_libgcrypt(false); _cleanup_(gcry_md_closep) gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; size_t hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); assert(hash_size > 0); if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size) return 0; gcry_error_t err = gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); if (gcry_err_code(err) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR || !md) return -EIO; gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r); if (mask_revoke) md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags & ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); else md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags); md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); gcry_md_write(md, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size); void *result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); if (!result) return -EIO; #endif return memcmp(result, ds->ds.digest, ds->ds.digest_size) == 0; } int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { DnsResourceRecord *ds; DnsAnswerFlags flags; int r; assert(dnskey); if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) return 0; DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(ds, flags, validated_ds) { if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) continue; if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) continue; if (ds->key->class != dnskey->key->class) continue; r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), dns_resource_key_name(ds->key)); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; r = dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(dnskey, ds, false); if (IN_SET(r, -EKEYREJECTED, -EOPNOTSUPP)) continue; /* The DNSKEY is revoked or otherwise invalid, or we don't support the digest algorithm */ if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) return 1; } return 0; } static hash_md_t nsec3_hash_to_hash_md(uint8_t algorithm) { /* Translates a DNSSEC NSEC3 hash algorithm into an openssl/gcrypt digest identifier */ switch (algorithm) { case NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha1(), GCRY_MD_SHA1); default: return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NULL, -EOPNOTSUPP); } } int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FORMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; int r; assert(nsec3); assert(name); assert(ret); if (nsec3->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) return -EINVAL; if (nsec3->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Ignoring NSEC3 RR %s with excessive number of iterations.", dns_resource_record_to_string(nsec3)); hash_md_t algorithm = nsec3_hash_to_hash_md(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm); #if PREFER_OPENSSL if (!algorithm) return -EOPNOTSUPP; size_t hash_size = EVP_MD_size(algorithm); assert(hash_size > 0); if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size) return -EINVAL; _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, algorithm, NULL) <= 0) return -EIO; r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true); if (r < 0) return r; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, wire_format, r) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) <= 0) return -EIO; uint8_t result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, result, NULL) <= 0) return -EIO; for (unsigned k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) { if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, algorithm, NULL) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, result, hash_size) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) <= 0) return -EIO; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, result, NULL) <= 0) return -EIO; } #else if (algorithm < 0) return algorithm; initialize_libgcrypt(false); unsigned hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algorithm); assert(hash_size > 0); if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size) return -EINVAL; r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true); if (r < 0) return r; _cleanup_(gcry_md_closep) gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; gcry_error_t err = gcry_md_open(&md, algorithm, 0); if (gcry_err_code(err) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR || !md) return -EIO; gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r); gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); void *result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); if (!result) return -EIO; for (unsigned k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) { uint8_t tmp[hash_size]; memcpy(tmp, result, hash_size); gcry_md_reset(md); gcry_md_write(md, tmp, hash_size); gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); if (!result) return -EIO; } #endif memcpy(ret, result, hash_size); return (int) hash_size; } static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsResourceRecord *nsec3) { const char *a, *b; int r; assert(rr); if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) return 0; /* RFC 5155, Section 8.2 says we MUST ignore NSEC3 RRs with flags != 0 or 1 */ if (!IN_SET(rr->nsec3.flags, 0, 1)) return 0; /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs whose algorithm we don't know */ #if PREFER_OPENSSL if (!nsec3_hash_to_hash_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm)) return 0; #else if (nsec3_hash_to_hash_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm) < 0) return 0; #endif /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs with an excessive number of required iterations */ if (rr->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) return 0; /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs generated from wildcards. If these NSEC3 RRs weren't correctly signed we can't make this * check (since rr->n_skip_labels_source is -1), but that's OK, as we won't trust them anyway in that case. */ if (!IN_SET(rr->n_skip_labels_source, 0, UINT8_MAX)) return 0; /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs that are located anywhere else than one label below the zone */ if (!IN_SET(rr->n_skip_labels_signer, 1, UINT8_MAX)) return 0; if (!nsec3) return 1; /* If a second NSEC3 RR is specified, also check if they are from the same zone. */ if (nsec3 == rr) /* Shortcut */ return 1; if (rr->key->class != nsec3->key->class) return 0; if (rr->nsec3.algorithm != nsec3->nsec3.algorithm) return 0; if (rr->nsec3.iterations != nsec3->nsec3.iterations) return 0; if (rr->nsec3.salt_size != nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) return 0; if (memcmp_safe(rr->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt, rr->nsec3.salt_size) != 0) return 0; a = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key); r = dns_name_parent(&a); /* strip off hash */ if (r <= 0) return r; b = dns_resource_key_name(nsec3->key); r = dns_name_parent(&b); /* strip off hash */ if (r <= 0) return r; /* Make sure both have the same parent */ return dns_name_equal(a, b); } static int nsec3_hashed_domain_format(const uint8_t *hashed, size_t hashed_size, const char *zone, char **ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL; char *j; assert(hashed); assert(hashed_size > 0); assert(zone); assert(ret); l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); if (!l) return -ENOMEM; j = strjoin(l, ".", zone); if (!j) return -ENOMEM; *ret = j; return (int) hashed_size; } static int nsec3_hashed_domain_make(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *domain, const char *zone, char **ret) { uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX]; int hashed_size; assert(nsec3); assert(domain); assert(zone); assert(ret); hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(nsec3, domain, hashed); if (hashed_size < 0) return hashed_size; return nsec3_hashed_domain_format(hashed, (size_t) hashed_size, zone, ret); } /* See RFC 5155, Section 8 * First try to find a NSEC3 record that matches our query precisely, if that fails, find the closest * enclosure. Secondly, find a proof that there is no closer enclosure and either a proof that there * is no wildcard domain as a direct descendant of the closest enclosure, or find an NSEC3 record that * matches the wildcard domain. * * Based on this we can prove either the existence of the record in @key, or NXDOMAIN or NODATA, or * that there is no proof either way. The latter is the case if a proof of non-existence of a given * name uses an NSEC3 record with the opt-out bit set. Lastly, if we are given insufficient NSEC3 records * to conclude anything we indicate this by returning NO_RR. */ static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *wildcard_domain = NULL; const char *zone, *p, *pp = NULL, *wildcard; DnsResourceRecord *rr, *enclosure_rr, *zone_rr, *wildcard_rr = NULL; DnsAnswerFlags flags; int hashed_size, r; bool a, no_closer = false, no_wildcard = false, optout = false; assert(key); assert(result); /* First step, find the zone name and the NSEC3 parameters of the zone. * it is sufficient to look for the longest common suffix we find with * any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3 * records from a given zone in a response must use the same * parameters. */ zone = dns_resource_key_name(key); for (;;) { DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(zone_rr, flags, answer) { r = nsec3_is_good(zone_rr, NULL); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; r = dns_name_equal_skip(dns_resource_key_name(zone_rr->key), 1, zone); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) goto found_zone; } /* Strip one label from the front */ r = dns_name_parent(&zone); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) break; } *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; return 0; found_zone: /* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */ p = dns_resource_key_name(key); for (;;) { _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL; hashed_size = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(zone_rr, p, zone, &hashed_domain); if (hashed_size == -EOPNOTSUPP) { *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; return 0; } if (hashed_size < 0) return hashed_size; DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(enclosure_rr, flags, answer) { r = nsec3_is_good(enclosure_rr, zone_rr); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size) continue; r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { a = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; goto found_closest_encloser; } } /* We didn't find the closest encloser with this name, * but let's remember this domain name, it might be * the next closer name */ pp = p; /* Strip one label from the front */ r = dns_name_parent(&p); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) break; } *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; return 0; found_closest_encloser: /* We found a closest encloser in 'p'; next closer is 'pp' */ if (!pp) { /* We have an exact match! If we area looking for a DS RR, then we must insist that we got the NSEC3 RR * from the parent. Otherwise the one from the child. Do so, by checking whether SOA and NS are * appropriately set. */ if (key->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) { if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) return -EBADMSG; } else { if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) return -EBADMSG; } /* No next closer NSEC3 RR. That means there's a direct NSEC3 RR for our key. */ if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; else if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; else *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; if (authenticated) *authenticated = a; if (ttl) *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; return 0; } /* Ensure this is not a DNAME domain, see RFC5155, section 8.3. */ if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) return -EBADMSG; /* Ensure that this data is from the delegated domain * (i.e. originates from the "lower" DNS server), and isn't * just glue records (i.e. doesn't originate from the "upper" * DNS server). */ if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) return -EBADMSG; /* Prove that there is no next closer and whether or not there is a wildcard domain. */ wildcard = strjoina("*.", p); r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(enclosure_rr, wildcard, zone, &wildcard_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if (r != hashed_size) return -EBADMSG; r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(enclosure_rr, pp, zone, &next_closer_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if (r != hashed_size) return -EBADMSG; DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { _cleanup_free_ char *next_hashed_domain = NULL; r = nsec3_is_good(rr, zone_rr); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; r = nsec3_hashed_domain_format(rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, zone, &next_hashed_domain); if (r < 0) return r; r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), next_closer_domain, next_hashed_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) optout = true; a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); no_closer = true; } r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wildcard_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); wildcard_rr = rr; } r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) /* This only makes sense if we have a wildcard delegation, which is * very unlikely, see RFC 4592, Section 4.2, but we cannot rely on * this not happening, so hence cannot simply conclude NXDOMAIN as * we would wish */ optout = true; a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); no_wildcard = true; } } if (wildcard_rr && no_wildcard) return -EBADMSG; if (!no_closer) { *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; return 0; } if (wildcard_rr) { /* A wildcard exists that matches our query. */ if (optout) /* This is not specified in any RFC to the best of my knowledge, but * if the next closer enclosure is covered by an opt-out NSEC3 RR * it means that we cannot prove that the source of synthesis is * correct, as there may be a closer match. */ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; else *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; } else { if (optout) /* The RFC only specifies that we have to care for optout for NODATA for * DS records. However, children of an insecure opt-out delegation should * also be considered opt-out, rather than verified NXDOMAIN. * Note that we do not require a proof of wildcard non-existence if the * next closer domain is covered by an opt-out, as that would not provide * any additional information. */ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; else if (no_wildcard) *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; else { *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; return 0; } } if (authenticated) *authenticated = a; if (ttl) *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; return 0; } static int dnssec_nsec_wildcard_equal(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { char label[DNS_LABEL_MAX]; const char *n; int r; assert(rr); assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); /* Checks whether the specified RR has a name beginning in "*.", and if the rest is a suffix of our name */ if (rr->n_skip_labels_source != 1) return 0; n = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key); r = dns_label_unescape(&n, label, sizeof label, 0); if (r <= 0) return r; if (r != 1 || label[0] != '*') return 0; return dns_name_endswith(name, n); } static int dnssec_nsec_in_path(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { const char *nn, *common_suffix; int r; assert(rr); assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); /* Checks whether the specified nsec RR indicates that name is an empty non-terminal (ENT) * * A couple of examples: * * NSEC bar → waldo.foo.bar: indicates that foo.bar exists and is an ENT * NSEC waldo.foo.bar → yyy.zzz.xoo.bar: indicates that xoo.bar and zzz.xoo.bar exist and are ENTs * NSEC yyy.zzz.xoo.bar → bar: indicates pretty much nothing about ENTs */ /* First, determine parent of next domain. */ nn = rr->nsec.next_domain_name; r = dns_name_parent(&nn); if (r <= 0) return r; /* If the name we just determined is not equal or child of the name we are interested in, then we can't say * anything at all. */ r = dns_name_endswith(nn, name); if (r <= 0) return r; /* If the name we are interested in is not a prefix of the common suffix of the NSEC RR's owner and next domain names, then we can't say anything either. */ r = dns_name_common_suffix(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix); if (r < 0) return r; return dns_name_endswith(name, common_suffix); } static int dnssec_nsec_from_parent_zone(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { int r; assert(rr); assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); /* Checks whether this NSEC originates to the parent zone or the child zone. */ r = dns_name_parent(&name); if (r <= 0) return r; r = dns_name_equal(name, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); if (r <= 0) return r; /* DNAME, and NS without SOA is an indication for a delegation. */ if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) return 1; if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && !bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) return 1; return 0; } static int dnssec_nsec_covers(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { const char *signer; int r; assert(rr); assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); /* Checks whether the name is covered by this NSEC RR. This means, that the name is somewhere below the NSEC's * signer name, and between the NSEC's two names. */ r = dns_resource_record_signer(rr, &signer); if (r < 0) return r; r = dns_name_endswith(name, signer); /* this NSEC isn't suitable the name is not in the signer's domain */ if (r <= 0) return r; return dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name); } static int dnssec_nsec_generate_wildcard(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name, char **wc) { const char *common_suffix1, *common_suffix2, *signer; int r, labels1, labels2; assert(rr); assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); /* Generates "Wildcard at the Closest Encloser" for the given name and NSEC RR. */ r = dns_resource_record_signer(rr, &signer); if (r < 0) return r; r = dns_name_endswith(name, signer); /* this NSEC isn't suitable the name is not in the signer's domain */ if (r <= 0) return r; r = dns_name_common_suffix(name, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), &common_suffix1); if (r < 0) return r; r = dns_name_common_suffix(name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix2); if (r < 0) return r; labels1 = dns_name_count_labels(common_suffix1); if (labels1 < 0) return labels1; labels2 = dns_name_count_labels(common_suffix2); if (labels2 < 0) return labels2; if (labels1 > labels2) r = dns_name_concat("*", common_suffix1, 0, wc); else r = dns_name_concat("*", common_suffix2, 0, wc); if (r < 0) return r; return 0; } int dnssec_nsec_test(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { bool have_nsec3 = false, covering_rr_authenticated = false, wildcard_rr_authenticated = false; DnsResourceRecord *rr, *covering_rr = NULL, *wildcard_rr = NULL; DnsAnswerFlags flags; const char *name; int r; assert(key); assert(result); /* Look for any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that say something about the specified key. */ name = dns_resource_key_name(key); DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { if (rr->key->class != key->class) continue; have_nsec3 = have_nsec3 || (rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC3); if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC) continue; /* The following checks only make sense for NSEC RRs that are not expanded from a wildcard */ r = dns_resource_record_is_synthetic(rr); if (r == -ENODATA) /* No signing RR known. */ continue; if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) continue; /* Check if this is a direct match. If so, we have encountered a NODATA case */ r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) { /* If it's not a direct match, maybe it's a wild card match? */ r = dnssec_nsec_wildcard_equal(rr, name); if (r < 0) return r; } if (r > 0) { if (key->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) { /* If we look for a DS RR and the server sent us the NSEC RR of the child zone * we have a problem. For DS RRs we want the NSEC RR from the parent */ if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) continue; } else { /* For all RR types, ensure that if NS is set SOA is set too, so that we know * we got the child's NSEC. */ if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && !bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) continue; } if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type)) *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; else if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; else *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; if (authenticated) *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; if (ttl) *ttl = rr->ttl; return 0; } /* Check if the name we are looking for is an empty non-terminal within the owner or next name * of the NSEC RR. */ r = dnssec_nsec_in_path(rr, name); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; if (authenticated) *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; if (ttl) *ttl = rr->ttl; return 0; } /* The following two "covering" checks, are not useful if the NSEC is from the parent */ r = dnssec_nsec_from_parent_zone(rr, name); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) continue; /* Check if this NSEC RR proves the absence of an explicit RR under this name */ r = dnssec_nsec_covers(rr, name); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0 && (!covering_rr || !covering_rr_authenticated)) { covering_rr = rr; covering_rr_authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; } } if (covering_rr) { _cleanup_free_ char *wc = NULL; r = dnssec_nsec_generate_wildcard(covering_rr, name, &wc); if (r < 0) return r; DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { if (rr->key->class != key->class) continue; if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC) continue; /* Check if this NSEC RR proves the nonexistence of the wildcard */ r = dnssec_nsec_covers(rr, wc); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0 && (!wildcard_rr || !wildcard_rr_authenticated)) { wildcard_rr = rr; wildcard_rr_authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; } } } if (covering_rr && wildcard_rr) { /* If we could prove that neither the name itself, nor the wildcard at the closest encloser exists, we * proved the NXDOMAIN case. */ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; if (authenticated) *authenticated = covering_rr_authenticated && wildcard_rr_authenticated; if (ttl) *ttl = MIN(covering_rr->ttl, wildcard_rr->ttl); return 0; } /* OK, this was not sufficient. Let's see if NSEC3 can help. */ if (have_nsec3) return dnssec_test_nsec3(answer, key, result, authenticated, ttl); /* No appropriate NSEC RR found, report this. */ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; return 0; } static int dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(DnsAnswer *answer, uint16_t type, const char *name, const char *zone, bool *authenticated) { DnsResourceRecord *rr; DnsAnswerFlags flags; int r; assert(name); assert(zone); /* Checks whether there's an NSEC/NSEC3 that proves that the specified 'name' is non-existing in the specified * 'zone'. The 'zone' must be a suffix of the 'name'. */ DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { bool found = false; if (rr->key->type != type && type != DNS_TYPE_ANY) continue; switch (rr->key->type) { case DNS_TYPE_NSEC: /* We only care for NSEC RRs from the indicated zone */ r = dns_resource_record_is_signer(rr, zone); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name); if (r < 0) return r; found = r > 0; break; case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3: { _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL, *next_hashed_domain = NULL; /* We only care for NSEC3 RRs from the indicated zone */ r = dns_resource_record_is_signer(rr, zone); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; r = nsec3_is_good(rr, NULL); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) break; /* Format the domain we are testing with the NSEC3 RR's hash function */ r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make( rr, name, zone, &hashed_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if ((size_t) r != rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size) break; /* Format the NSEC3's next hashed name as proper domain name */ r = nsec3_hashed_domain_format( rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, zone, &next_hashed_domain); if (r < 0) return r; r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), hashed_domain, next_hashed_domain); if (r < 0) return r; found = r > 0; break; } default: continue; } if (found) { if (authenticated) *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; return 1; } } return 0; } static int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec3( DnsAnswer *answer, const char *name, const char *source, const char *zone, bool *authenticated) { const char *next_closer = NULL; int r; /* Run a positive NSEC3 wildcard proof. Specifically: * * A proof that the "next closer" of the generating wildcard does not exist. * * Note a key difference between the NSEC3 and NSEC versions of the proof. NSEC RRs don't have to exist for * empty non-transients. NSEC3 RRs however have to. This means it's sufficient to check if the next closer name * exists for the NSEC3 RR and we are done. * * To prove that a.b.c.d.e.f is rightfully synthesized from a wildcard *.d.e.f all we have to check is that * c.d.e.f does not exist. */ for (;;) { next_closer = name; r = dns_name_parent(&name); if (r <= 0) return r; r = dns_name_equal(name, source); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) break; } return dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC3, next_closer, zone, authenticated); } static int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec( DnsAnswer *answer, const char *name, const char *source, const char *zone, bool *_authenticated) { bool authenticated = true; int r; /* Run a positive NSEC wildcard proof. Specifically: * * A proof that there's neither a wildcard name nor a non-wildcard name that is a suffix of the name "name" and * a prefix of the synthesizing source "source" in the zone "zone". * * See RFC 5155, Section 8.8 and RFC 4035, Section 5.3.4 * * Note that if we want to prove that a.b.c.d.e.f is rightfully synthesized from a wildcard *.d.e.f, then we * have to prove that none of the following exist: * * 1) a.b.c.d.e.f * 2) *.b.c.d.e.f * 3) b.c.d.e.f * 4) *.c.d.e.f * 5) c.d.e.f */ for (;;) { _cleanup_free_ char *wc = NULL; bool a = false; /* Check if there's an NSEC or NSEC3 RR that proves that the mame we determined is really non-existing, * i.e between the owner name and the next name of an NSEC RR. */ r = dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC, name, zone, &a); if (r <= 0) return r; authenticated = authenticated && a; /* Strip one label off */ r = dns_name_parent(&name); if (r <= 0) return r; /* Did we reach the source of synthesis? */ r = dns_name_equal(name, source); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { /* Successful exit */ *_authenticated = authenticated; return 1; } /* Safety check, that the source of synthesis is still our suffix */ r = dns_name_endswith(name, source); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) return -EBADMSG; /* Replace the label we stripped off with an asterisk */ wc = strjoin("*.", name); if (!wc) return -ENOMEM; /* And check if the proof holds for the asterisk name, too */ r = dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC, wc, zone, &a); if (r <= 0) return r; authenticated = authenticated && a; /* In the next iteration we'll check the non-asterisk-prefixed version */ } } int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard( DnsAnswer *answer, const char *name, const char *source, const char *zone, bool *authenticated) { int r; assert(name); assert(source); assert(zone); assert(authenticated); r = dns_answer_contains_zone_nsec3(answer, zone); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) return dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec3(answer, name, source, zone, authenticated); else return dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec(answer, name, source, zone, authenticated); } #else int dnssec_verify_rrset( DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, usec_t realtime, DnssecResult *result) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, usec_t realtime, DnssecResult *result, DnsResourceRecord **ret_rrsig) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_nsec_test(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard( DnsAnswer *answer, const char *name, const char *source, const char *zone, bool *authenticated) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } #endif static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = { [DNSSEC_VALIDATED] = "validated", [DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD] = "validated-wildcard", [DNSSEC_INVALID] = "invalid", [DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED] = "signature-expired", [DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM] = "unsupported-algorithm", [DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE] = "no-signature", [DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY] = "missing-key", [DNSSEC_UNSIGNED] = "unsigned", [DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary", [DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch", [DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER] = "incompatible-server", [DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS] = "too-many-validations", }; DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult); static const char* const dnssec_verdict_table[_DNSSEC_VERDICT_MAX] = { [DNSSEC_SECURE] = "secure", [DNSSEC_INSECURE] = "insecure", [DNSSEC_BOGUS] = "bogus", [DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE] = "indeterminate", }; DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_verdict, DnssecVerdict);